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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examined the characteristics of internal accounting control system based on size of 
human resources assigned to the system to verify whether downward stickiness of total cost and 
selling and administrative expenses differentially appears according to the level. 
 
An entrepreneur who wishes to maximize one's utility has an incentive to externally grow the 
enterprise beyond the optimal size or to possess idle resources, creating cost sticking phenomenon 
by possessing surplus resources even when sales volume decreases. Previous studies verified the 
effect of control system intended to resolve the agency problem on asymmetry of cost. This study 
expanded the scope of previous studies to consider internal accounting control system as a 
monitor of the agency problem. Enterprises that effectively operate internal accounting control 
system are expected to show limited opportunistic incentive of the entrepreneurs because of 
reduced agency cost. 
 
The main purpose for enterprises to establish and operate internal accounting control system is to 
provide accurate and reliable financial information to investors by preventing or uncovering 
accounting scandals of the management and possibility of errors. Internal accounting control 
system of Korea was first introduced in September 2001 through 'Corporate Restructuring 
Promotion Act', and Financial Supervisory Service announced the regulation on public 
announcement in September 2002 as a series of relevant measures. The regulation requires 
enterprises to publicly announce the number of workers in each department in charge of internal 
accounting control system on the internal accounting control system report. Under the 
presumption that internal accounting control can be more effectively done by increasing the 
number of workers in charge of internal accounting control system, the intent of such public 
announcement is to provide external interested parties with information that can be used to 
determine whether internal accounting control system of an enterprise is being effectively 
managed. Accordingly in this study, enterprises with large size of human resources assigned to 
internal accounting control system were predicted to show relaxed downward stickiness of cost. 
 
As a result of verifying 2,532 enterprise-year samples listed on Korea Stock Exchange between 
2003 and 2008, enterprises with larger size of human resources assigned to internal accounting 
control system were found to show relaxed downward stickiness of cost. This means that an 
enterprise with large number of workers assigned to internal accounting control system can 
effectively monitor the enterprise, which can efficiently control opportunistic decisions of the 
entrepreneur such as downward stickiness of cost. As an additional analysis, human resources 
were classified into departments to which persons in charge of internal accounting are affiliated 
to examine the effect on downward stickiness of cost. As a result of verification, high ratio of 
internal accounting personnel assigned to accounting department resulted in relaxed downward 
stickiness of cost. Accounting departments in charge of preparing for financial statements were 
more effectively performing monitoring work compared to other departments. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
his study analyzed the effect of human characteristics of internal accounting control system on 
asymmetric cost behavior of enterprises. In specific, effectiveness of internal accounting control 
system was examined by size of human resources assigned to internal accounting control system, 
empirically verifying whether asymmetric cost behavior of an enterprise is differentiated by the level of internal 
accounting control system. 
 
Traditional cost model assumed that cost shows symmetric behavior regardless of increase and decrease in 
operating rate (Noreen 1991). However, an argument was proposed (Cooper and Kaplan 1998) that cost shows 
downward sticky behavior because it is more difficult to reduce cost when activity level is reduced than to increase 
cost when activity level is increased. Previous studies conducted at home and abroad including the study of 
Anderson et al. (2003) report downward sticky behavior of cost. Specifically, Anderson et al. (2003) verified that the 
change in cost differs when activity level of an enterprise increases and decreases, pointing out the agency problems 
such as pursuit of private benefit and utility by the entrepreneur as a cause of downward sticky behavior. In other 
words, since reducing size of the organization or dismissing an employee who shares the same interest brings 
damages the personal dignity of the entrepreneur, the entrepreneur has an incentive to not actively reduce surplus 
resources when sales volume decreases. Chen et al. (2012) also presented a view that empire-building tendency and 
perquisite consumption of entrepreneurs induce downward sticky behavior of cost. On one hand, subsequent studies 
verified diverse effects of corporate governance structure on downward stickiness of cost under the judgment that 
opportunistic incentives of an entrepreneur are limited by reduced agency cost in an enterprise with effective control 
structure because it has high efficiency of monitoring. 
 
This study paid attention to internal accounting control system as a monitor to control downward stickiness 
of cost resulting from opportunistic incentives of an entrepreneur. The purpose of internal accounting control system 
is to control errors and corruptions in accounting information among various intents of internal control, and to 
prepare and publicly announce reliable accounting information through regular inspection and adjustment of 
accounting information.  Accordingly, this study attempted to examine whether internal accounting control system 
introduced as a means to control errors and corruptions in accounting information performs the role of a monitor in 
lessening the agency problem of an enterprise. Specifically, effectiveness of internal accounting control system was 
examined by size of human resources assigned to internal accounting control system, analyzing whether downward 
stickiness of cost is shown differently according to the level.  
 
In the United States, large-scale accounting scandals of Enron and World Com which occurred during early 
2000s presented the need to establish and reinforce a system for monitoring corruption of entrepreneurs. An 
accounting reform law called Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was legislated in 2002. Article 404 of SOX requires the 
management of a company to establish and evaluate internal control measure to improve quality of financial 
statements, while at the same time demanding external auditor to review appropriateness of such internal control. 
Such measure shows that establishment of an appropriate internal accounting control system is an essential condition 
to improve reliability of accounting information. To establish internal accounting control system for increased 
reliability of accounting information, Korea has temporarily included regulation on internal accounting control 
system in the Corporate Restructuring Promotion Act in 2001. At the 16th regular meeting of Financial Supervisory 
Commission, internal accounting control system operation report was revised in the [Regulation on Financial 
Supervisory Agencies for Corporate Restructuring Promotion] to require enterprises to additionally announce the 
current status of internal accounting control organization and certified public accountants, starting with the business 
reports of enterprises settling their accounts in December 2002. 
 
On one hand, information about size of human resources in charge of internal accounting control system is 
only publicly announced in Korea. The reason for regulatory institutions to force public announcement of this 
information is to offer external interested parties with the grounds to judge the effectiveness of internal accounting 
control system of an enterprise. That is, this regulation reflects the expectation that enterprises placing greater 
investment on internal accounting personnel are more effectively operating their internal accounting control system. 
Therefore, it is necessary to verify how effectiveness of monitoring is differentiated according to size of internal 
accounting personnel. Accordingly in this study, effectiveness of internal accounting control system was examined 
T 
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by size of human resources in charge to find the effect of effective operation of system on opportunistic decisions of 
entrepreneurs. An entrepreneur has a tendency to maintain surplus resources when sales volume is reduced because 
of one's empire-building tendency and perquisite consumption, and maintenance cost involved with such tendency 
reduces quality of financial statements as a product of agency problem. 
 
Conclusions and contributions of this study are as follows. First, this study considered internal accounting 
control system as a monitor of agency problems. Effectiveness of internal accounting control system can be 
examined by size of human resources assigned to internal accounting control system. Larger size of human 
resources was predicted to show higher efficiency of monitoring on decisions of entrepreneurs. As a result of 
analysis, enterprises with large size of human resources showed more elastic reduction of cost with decrease in sales 
volume. The result verified that sufficient number of internal accounting personnel allows for appropriate 
distribution of work and timely review and monitoring of decision making by entrepreneurs, resulting in effective 
internal control. 
 
This study consists of the following. Chapter II introduces theoretical background, summarizes previous 
studies and sets forth the hypothesis of this study. Chapter III explains the process of selecting samples used for 
testing of the hypothesis and study model. Chapter IV explains the results of empirical analysis, and Chapter V 
summarizes the conclusions and contributions of this study. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Literature Review 
 
Ever since SOX of the United States specified details of internal accounting control system, many studies 
were conducted on internal accounting control system. Previous studies used vulnerability report as an alternative 
value to examine operating condition of internal accounting management system.  
 
First, companies with vulnerabilities to internal accounting control system were analyzed in comparison to 
companies without vulnerabilities. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) discovered that enterprises reporting 
vulnerabilities in internal control had more complex business activities, recent change in the organization, more 
frequent replacement of external auditor, and small amount of resources used to operate internal control compared to 
enterprises that did not report vulnerabilities. Doyle et al. (2007a) reported that enterprises showing important 
vulnerabilities were small, newborn, financially weak, in high growth and under restructuring. Also, Ge and McVay 
(2005) argued that important vulnerabilities result from assignment of insufficiently trained accounting personnel. 
Krishnan (2005) mentioned that low quality of audit committee measured by size, independence and expertise is 
highly correlated to discovery of important vulnerabilities. 
 
There are studies that investigated the relationship between vulnerabilities of internal accounting control 
system and earnings quality. As a result of examining discretionary accruals, mean accruals, rewriting of financial 
statements in the past, and earnings persistence as alternative values of earnings quality, Doyle et al. (2007b) 
reported that earnings quality of companies with important vulnerabilities in internal control is lower than earnings 
quality of companies without vulnerabilities. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008) reported that enterprises reporting 
vulnerabilities in internal control show lower quality of accruals compared to other enterprises, and those enterprises 
improving such vulnerabilities show increased quality of accruals compared to enterprises that do not improve 
vulnerabilities. 
 
Meanwhile, existing studies examined the level of internal accounting control system based on existence 
of vulnerabilities in internal accounting control system. This means that enterprises reporting vulnerabilities have 
low effectiveness of internal accounting control system and enterprises without vulnerabilities are effectively 
operating internal accounting control system. However, since effectiveness of system can be shown differently 
among enterprises that do no report vulnerabilities according to characteristics of human resources, there is a limit to 
determining effectiveness of internal accounting management system simply based on reporting of vulnerabilities.  
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Information about size of human resources in charge of internal accounting control is not publicly 
announced in countries other than Korea. Thus, there is lack of studies on size of human resources in charge of 
internal accounting control. Nonetheless, since effective operation of internal accounting control system depends on 
human resources in charge of internal accounting, size of human resources in charge of internal accounting control 
can be useful information for external information users in examining effectiveness of internal accounting control 
system for a specific enterprise. 
 
Ge and McVay (2005) mentioned 'lack of qualified accounting personnel' as the foremost reason for 
ineffectiveness of internal control. Choi et al. (2011) analyzed the effect of investment in human resources in charge 
of internal accounting control system on existence of vulnerabilities in internal accounting control system and 
earnings quality. They discovered the fact that enterprises with greater investment on human resources in charge of 
internal accounting control system show higher earnings quality because possibility of vulnerabilities in internal 
accounting control system is reduced and earnings management measured as discretionary accruals is reduced. As 
such, enterprises that fail to secure sufficient internal accounting control personnel do not have enough personnel to 
operate internal accounting control system, showing relatively low effectiveness of internal control. In other words, 
such enterprises are less likely to have sufficient monitoring function to prevent and uncover errors or corruptive 
acts of entrepreneurs that can damage reliability of financial statements. Ultimately, enterprises that do not have 
sufficient human resources to operate internal accounting control system can be predicted to have higher possibility 
of accounting scandals compared to other enterprises. 
 
Hypothesis Development 
 
Traditional cost accounting assumed (Noreen 1991) proportionality of cost behavior in which change of 
cost is proportional to changes in operating rate and activity level, but recent studies are providing empirical 
evidences on asymmetry of cost behavior which are contrary to proportionality of cost behavior. As mentioned 
earlier, an entrepreneur who wishes to maximize one's utility has an incentive to externally grow the enterprise 
larger than its optimal size or to possess idle resources. Such entrepreneur causes fixing of cost by possessing 
surplus resources when sales volume is decreased. Downward stickiness of cost behavior caused by adjustment cost 
and agency cost seems to be a result of discretionary power of entrepreneurs, and such phenomenon appears as a 
result of decision making by entrepreneurs (Anderson et al. 2003). Therefore, a control system that monitors the 
decision making process of an entrepreneur can affect asymmetry of cost behavior (Chen et al. 2012).  
 
This study aims to consider internal accounting control system as a monitor to control downward 
stickiness of cost resulting from opportunistic incentives of an entrepreneur. Size of human resources assigned to 
internal accounting control is to be considered in this study as a variable to examine effectiveness of internal 
accounting control system. Sufficient number of internal accounting personnel means that internal accounting 
control work is distributed appropriately with timely review and monitoring on accounting functions. In other words, 
enterprises that make large investment on human resources of internal accounting control system can effectively 
perform internal control and show excellent quality of internal accounting control system (Choi et al. 2009). 
Therefore in this study, larger size of human resources in charge of internal accounting control system is predicted to 
show effective control of opportunistic decision making by entrepreneurs. That is, a negative (-) correlation will be 
shown between the number of human resources in charge of internal accounting control system and downward 
stickiness of cost. The first hypothesis is formulated as follows. 
 
Hypothesis: Larger size of human resources assigned to internal accounting control system will lessen downward 
stickiness of cost. 
 
Selection of Samples and Study Methodology  
 
Selection of Samples 
 
This study selected enterprises listed in the stock market between 2003 and 2008 that satisfy the following 
requirements as samples.  Samples were limited to enterprises settling their accounts at the end of December in order 
to secure timely homogeneity of data. In addition, enterprises that belong to the financial industry were excluded 
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from samples because they have different items and meanings of financial statements compared to general 
enterprises. Additionally, 982 enterprise-year samples were excluded in case financial data could not be collected or 
problem occurred during measurement of downward stickiness. Also, Winsorization was performed on top 1% and 
bottom 15 of variables used in the empirical analysis to control the effects of values. 2,532 enterprise-year were 
selected as final samples according to the conditions described above.  
 
Table 1. Compositions of Samples 
Category Sample Size 
Enterprise-year samples listed in the stock market between 2003 ~ 2008 4,638 
(Excluded) enterprise-year samples that do not settle their accounts in December or that belong to the 
financial industry (1,124) 
(Excluded) financial data could not be obtained or problem occurred during measurement of downward 
stickiness of cost (982) 
Enterprise-year samples used in the analysis 2,532 
 
Measurement of Cost Asymmetry 
 
In this study, downward stickiness of cost was measured using the method of Weiss (2010). Existing 
studies mainly used the model of Anderson et al. (2003) to measure cost behavior. The model of Anderson et al. 
(2003) cross-sectionally defines downward stickiness as a phenomenon in which the rate of increase in cost with 
increase in sales is larger than decrease in cost with decrease in sales. This model had a limitation in measuring 
changes in cost against change in sales for individual enterprises. Accordingly in this study, the model of Weiss 
(2010) that can measure downward stickiness of cost for individual enterprises was utilized. Weiss (2010) directly 
measured the difference between the rate of increase in cost with increase in sales and the rate of decrease in cost 
with decrease in sales on the level of individual enterprises, and defined this difference as downward stickiness of 
cost. Specific measurement method is as follows. 
   𝑆𝑇𝐼𝐶𝐾𝑌!" = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ∆!"#$∆!"#$! !" − 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ∆!"#$∆!"#$! !"      𝛾, 𝜇 ∈ {𝑡,… , 𝑡 − 3} 
 𝑆𝑇𝐼𝐶𝐾𝑌!" : downward stickiness of cost for term t of enterprise i 𝛾 : quarters during which sales decreased among recent 16 quarters 𝜇 : quarters during which sales increased among recent 16 quarters ∆sales!" : change in sales of enterprise i for term t   (sales!" − sales!"!!) ∆cost!" : change in cost of enterprise i for term t    (cost!" − cost!"!!) 
 
Weiss (2010) defined downward stickiness of cost (STICKY) for individual enterprises as the difference 
between the rate of decrease in cost with decrease in sales of the recent quarters and the rate of increase in cost with 
increase in sales of the recent quarters. According to the method used by Weiss (2010), this study also measured 
STICKY variable for 16 quarters by subtracting the slope of cost function for the recent quarters during which sales 
have increased from the slope of cost function for the recent quarters during which sales have decreased.  If cost is 
downward sticky, the degree of reduction in cost with decrease in sales is smaller than the degree of increase in cost 
with increase in sales. STICKY will have a negative (-) value. Furthermore, when the value of STICKY is measured 
to be 0, it represents a symmetric cost behavior. When the value of STICKY is larger than 0, it refers to a downward 
elasticity of cost. For ease of interpretation on empirical analysis in this study, the value obtained by multiplying 
STICKY with (-1) was used as the alternative value. 
 
Asymmetry Measurement of Human Resources in Charge of Internal Accounting Control System 
 
Current status of internal accounting control organization personnel and certified public accountants has 
been publicly announced as an attachment to the business reports called "operating report on internal accounting 
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control system" since 2002. In this study, size of personnel assigned to internal accounting control system was 
examined through "operating report on internal accounting control system" to find the effect of human resource 
characteristics of internal accounting control system on downward stickiness of cost.  
 
Research Model  
 
This study attempts to verify the change in downward sticky behavior according to human resources of 
internal accounting control system. Using IC as a dependent variable for the number of human resources assigned to 
internal accounting control system, an independent variable, dummy variable (STICKYD1) for downward stickiness 
of cost measured by selling and administrative expenses and dummy variable (STICKYD2) for downward stickiness 
of cost measured by total cost were set forth.  IC was measured as a value obtained by taking natural log on the 
number of human resources assigned to internal accounting control system. Control variables included conglomerate 
(GROUPD), asset intensity of enterprise (SIZE), employee intensity (WORKER), cash flow for operation (CFO), 
consecutive reduction of sales for two years (SALES) and debt ratio (LEV). First, according to the study of 
Anderson et al. (2003) which mentioned that adjustment cost needed for an entrepreneur to reduce resources 
increases with increasing asset intensity, asset intensity (SIZE) was included as a control variable. In addition, since 
a labor-intensive enterprise that requires human resources for sales experiences adjustment cost  when sales 
increases after reducing surplus personnel due to decrease in sales, employee intensity was included as a control 
variable to consider the effect of employee intensity on downward stickiness of cost. As enterprises with high cash 
flow ratio or liquidity have greater ability to maintain surplus resources with decrease in sales, previous study 
(Anderson et al. 2003) suggested that downward stickiness of cost becomes relatively stronger. Cash flow for 
operation (CFO) computed by dividing cash flow from operating activities by total asset was considered as a control 
variable. Lastly, consecutive reduction in sales for two years (SALES) was taken into account as a control variable. 
When profit of enterprises decreases for two consecutive years, entrepreneurs have an incentive to judge that 
demand will be reduced in the long term and decide to reduce cost according to decrease in sales (Chen et al. 2012). 
 𝑆𝑇𝐼𝐶𝐾𝑌!" = 𝛽! + 𝛽!𝐼𝐶!" + 𝛽!𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑈𝑃𝐷!" + 𝛽!𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸!" + 𝛽!𝑊𝑂𝑅𝐾𝐸𝑅!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝐹𝑂!" + 𝛽!𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆!" + 𝛽!𝐿𝐸𝑉!" + 𝜖!! 
STICKYD1  
 
: dummy variable for downward stickiness of cost scaled by selling and 
administrative expenses, 1 if sticky<0, 0 otherwise 
STICKYD2  
 
: dummy variable for downward stickiness of cost scaled by total cost, 1 if 
sticky<0, 0 otherwise 
IC : ln(=number of personnel of internal accounting) 
GROUPD : 1 if the enterprise belongs to a conglomerate, 0 otherwise 
SIZE : ln(total asset of current term/total sales of current term) 
WORKER : (number of employees*1,000,000/total sales of current term) 
CFO 
 
: (Cash flow from operating activities of the current term/ total asset of the 
current term) 
SALES : 1 if sales of term t-1 is decreased compared to term t-2, 0 otherwise 
LEV : (total debt of the current term/total asset of the current term) 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis 
 
Table 2 summarizes descriptive statistics of major variables used to test the hypothesis of this study. First, 
the variable IC that represents the number of human resources assigned to internal accounting control system was 
measured as a natural log value. The mean value of 2.682, which corresponds to 14.6 employees per enterprise 
assigned to internal accounting control system when converted to the number of persons. Dummy variable 
STICKYD1 is a variable for downward stickiness of cost measured by selling and administrative expenses 
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according to Weiss (2010), and the value of this variable is 1 when it represents a negative (－) value and 0 
otherwise. STICKYD2 is also a dummy variable that measures downward cost stickiness of Weiss (2010) based on 
total cost. The value of this variable is 1 when it represents a negative (－) value and 0 otherwise. In other words, 
enterprises that show downward sticky cost behavior are granted with a value of 1 for dummy variables. The mean 
values (median values) of STICKYD1 and STICKYD2 were found to be 0.194 (0) and 0.368 (0), respectively. 
STICKY1 is a value that multiplied (-1) with the continuous variable for downward cost stickiness of Weiss (2010) 
measured by selling and administrative expenses. STICKY2 is a value that multiplied (-1) with the continuous 
variable for downward cost stickiness of Weiss (2010) measured by total cost. Therefore, larger positive (+) values 
of STICKY1 and STICKY2 can be interpreted as greater downward stickiness of cost behavior. The mean (median) 
values of these variables were respectively 0.178 (0.175) and 0.224 (0.135), showing positive (＋) values. The 
majority of enterprises were confirmed to have downward sticky behavior of cost. The mean (median) value of asset 
intensity variable SIZE was 1.634 (1.095), and its maximum and minimum values were 16.891 and 0.324. This 
shows a great difference in asset intensity between enterprises. The mean (median) value of employee variable 
WORKER was 0.003 (0.002), and the mean (median) value of cash flow variable for operating activities of the 
current term CFO was 0.052 (0.088). The mean (median) value of dummy variable on reduction of sales for term t-1 
compared to term t-2, SALES, was 0.239 (0.000). Only 24% of enterprises showed reduction in sales during term t-1 
compared to term t-2. 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard deviation Minimum Median Maximum 
STICKYD1 0.178 1.765 -4.516 0.175 4.881 
STICKYD2 0.224 1.011 -3.006 0.135 3.996 
STICKY1 0.194 0.396 0 0 1 
STICKY2 0.368 0.482 0 0 1 
IC 2.682 0.785 0 2.565 6.525 
GROUPD 0.176 0.381 0 0 1 
SIZE 1.634 2.214 0.324 1.095 16.891 
WORKER 0.003 0.004 0 0.002 0.027 
CFO 0.052 0.088 -0.227 0.05 0.31 
SALES 0.239 0.427 0 0 1 
LEV 0.462 0.208 0 0.463 3.632 
Variable Definitions: 
STICKYD1 is cost stickiness dummy variable scaled by selling and administrative expenses. 1 if sticky is less than 0, otherwise 0. 
STICKYD2 is cost stickiness dummy variable scaled by total cost. 1 if sticky is less than 0, otherwise 0.   
STICKY1 is cost stickiness continuous variable scaled by selling and administrative expenses. 
STICKY1 is cost stickiness continuous variable scaled by total cost. 
IC is the natural logarithm of number of personnel of internal accounting 
GROUPD is 1 if the enterprise belongs to a conglomerate, 0 otherwise 
SIZE  is the natural logarithm of (total asset of current term/total sales of current term) 
WORKER  is (number of employees*1,000,000/total sales of current term) 
CFO  is : (Cash flow from operating activities of the current term/ total asset of the current term) 
SALES  is 1 if sales of term t-1 is decreased compared to term t-2, 0 otherwise 
LEV  is (total debt of the current term/total asset of the current term) 
 
Table 3 shows the correlation among variables used in this study. First, STICKYD1 and STICKYD2 
agreed with the hypothesis by showing a significant negative (-) correlation at 1% significance level with IC. As a 
result of examining the correlation among control variables, correlation between all control variables was less than 
0.5. 
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Table 3. Pearson’s correlation 
 STICKYD2 IC GROUPD SIZE WORKER CFO SALES LEV 
STICKYD1 0.489 -0.214 0.034 -0.028 0.015 0.041 -0.019 -0.032 (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.1343) (0.2206) (0.5073) (0.0734) (0.3973) (0.194) 
STICKYD2  -0.133 0.002 -0.014 0.015 0.012 0.013 -0.05 (<.0001) (0.9256) (0.4292) (0.4048) (0.5052) (0.4744) (0.0071) 
IC   0.411 -0.004 -0.096 0.126 -0.073 0.106 (<.0001) (0.8184) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
GROUPD    -0.003 -0.084 0.07 -0.034 0.151 (0.8193) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0112) (<.0001) 
SIZE     0.132 -0.16 0.122 -0.095 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
WORKER      0.048 0.008 -0.049 (0.0006) (0.561) '(0.0012) 
CFO       -0.144 -0.175 (<.0001) (<.0001) 
SALES        
-0.018 
(0.2384) 
For definitions refer to Variable Definitions above. Values in parentheses are p-values. 
 
Multivariate Logistic Analysis 
 
Table 4 provides the results of logistic analysis carried out using STICKY dummy variable measured 
according to the method of Weiss (2010) as dependent variable in order to examine the effect of private debt on 
downward stickiness of cost. If increase in the number of personnel assigned to internal accounting control system 
shows increase in intensity of monitoring to result in efficient control of downward sticky cost behavior as proposed 
in the hypothesis of this study, interest factor β1 of IC will show a significant negative (－) value. 
 
As a result of analysis, estimated value of PRIVATE was －0.135 (Wald χ²=3.8815) when STICKYD1 is 
dependent variable and －0.137 (Wald χ²=5.5729) when STICKYD2 is dependent variable. It has significantly 
negative (-) influence on each dependent variable at 5% significance level. Such result agrees with the hypothesis of 
this study that increased number of personnel assigned to internal accounting control system will increase the 
monitoring effect and reduce cost fixation of enterprises. 
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Table 4: Effect of Internal Accounting Control System Personnel on Cost Stickiness 
Variables 
Dependent Variable 
STICKYD1 STICKYD2 
Estimate Wald χ² Estimate Wald χ² 
Intercept -0.822 5.1887** 0.871 7.6912*** 
IC -0.135 3.8815** -0.137 5.5729** 
GROUPD 0.252 3.5058* 0.019 0.0284 
SIZE -0.04 0.5259 -0.189 8.5529*** 
WORKER 1.085 0.003 -70.335 13.2764*** 
CFO 0.565 0.797 -1.106 4.0837** 
SALES -0.203 2.8987* -0.136 1.8121 
LEV -0.588 4.7708** -0.631 7.2184*** 
Year Dummies Included  
Industry Dummies Included  
Likelihood Ratio χ² 51.7211*** 95.8274*** 
Pseudo R² 0.02 0.03 
Sample Size 2,532 2,532 
Notes: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
Variable Definitions: 
STICKYD1 is cost stickiness dummy variable scaled by selling and administrative expenses. 1 if sticky is less than 0, otherwise 0. 
STICKYD2 is cost stickiness dummy variable scaled by total cost. 1 if sticky is less than 0, otherwise 0.   
STICKY1 is cost stickiness continuous variable scaled by selling and administrative expenses. 
STICKY1 is cost stickiness continuous variable scaled by total cost. 
IC is the natural logarithm of number of personnel of internal accounting 
GROUPD is 1 if the enterprise belongs to a conglomerate, 0 otherwise 
SIZE  is the natural logarithm of (total asset of current term/total sales of current term) 
WORKER  is (number of employees*1,000,000/total sales of current term) 
CFO  is : (Cash flow from operating activities of the current term/ total asset of the current term) 
SALES  is 1 if sales of term t-1 is decreased compared to term t-2, 0 otherwise 
LEV  is (total debt of the current term/total asset of the current term) 
 
Downward Stickiness of Cost Measured as Continuous Variable(Additional Test 1) 
 
Hypothesis testing model of this study measured downward stickiness of cost as a dummy variable. In this 
section, STICKY1 and STICKY2 that measured downward stickiness of cost as a continuous variable are used as 
dependent variables to perform regression analysis for securing robustness of the study. 
 
Table 5 shows the effect of variable IC for the number of human resources assigned to internal accounting 
control system on STICKY1 and STICKY2, the variables of downward cost stickiness measured as continuous 
variables. As a result of verification, when STICKY1 measured by selling and administrative expenses was 
dependent variable, the coefficient of IC for the number of human resources assigned to internal accounting control 
system was －0.477(t-value=－6.37). When STICKY2 measured by total cost was dependent variable, the 
coefficient of IC was －0.152 (t-value=－4.93). It showed significantly negative (-) influence on dependent 
variables at 1% significance level. The results of <Table 5> support robustness of the study results as they agree 
with the basic hypothesis testing results of this study. 
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Table 5: Effect of Internal Accounting Control System Personnel on Cost Stickiness Measured as Continuous Variable 
Variables 
Dependent Variable 
STICKY1 STICKY2 
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
Intercept 1.415 3.41*** 0.794 4.78*** 
IC -0.477 -6.37*** -0.152 -4.93*** 
GROUPD 0.582 3.75*** 0.113 1.8* 
SIZE 0.008 0.14 0.036 1.23 
WORKER 12.475 0.52 -5.671 -0.5 
CFO 0.363 0.5 -0.143 -0.47 
SALES 0.042 0.31 0.021 0.39 
LEV -0.616 -1.97** -0.291 -2.23** 
Year Dummies Included  
Industry Dummies Included  
F-value 3.00*** 2.81*** 
Adj. R² 0.04 0.02 
Sample Size 2,532 2,532 
Notes: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
STICKY1 is cost stickiness continuous variable scaled by selling and administrative expenses. 
STICKY1 is cost stickiness continuous variable scaled by total cost. 
IC is the natural logarithm of number of personnel of internal accounting 
GROUPD is 1 if the enterprise belongs to a conglomerate, 0 otherwise 
SIZE  is the natural logarithm of (total asset of current term/total sales of current term)  
WORKER  is (number of employees*1,000,000/total sales of current term) 
CFO  is : (Cash flow from operating activities of the current term/ total asset of the current term) 
SALES  is 1 if sales of term t-1 is decreased compared to term t-2, 0 otherwise 
LEV  is (total debt of the current term/total asset of the current term) 
 
IC Variable Controlled by Total Number of Executives and Employees (Additional Test 2) 
 
In this study, hypothesis was tested by measuring IC, the variable for internal accounting personnel, as a 
natural log value. Such measurement has a problem of not being able to account for the difference according to size 
of enterprise. Accordingly to secure robustness of this study, this section re-measures IC the variable for internal 
accounting personnel as a value divided by total number of executives and employees instead of natural log to 
perform logistic analysis. 
 
Table 6 shows the effect of internal accounting control system personnel variable IC on dummy variables 
STICKYD1 and STICKYD2 of downward cost stickiness. As a result of verification, estimated value of IC, the 
number of human resources assigned to internal accounting control system, was －1.524(Wald χ²=2.82) when 
STICKY1 measured by selling and administrative expenses was dependent variable. Estimated value of IC was －
1.732 (Wald χ²=6.06) when STICKY2 measured by total cost was dependent variable. It showed significantly 
negative (-) influence on dependent variables at 10% and 5% significance levels, respectively. The results in <Table 
6> support robustness of the study results as they agree with the basic hypothesis testing results of this study. 
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Table 6: Effect of Internal Accounting Control System Personnel on Cost Stickiness 
Variables 
Dependent Variable 
STICKYD1 STICKYD2 
Estimate Wald χ² Estimate Wald χ² 
Intercept -1.047 10.0267*** 0.606 4.4829** 
IC -1.524 2.8285* -1.732 6.0619** 
GROUPD 0.106 0.6961 -0.135 1.4985 
SIZE -0.034 0.3582 -0.167 6.5021** 
WORKER 3.319 0.0276 -69.43 12.6759*** 
CFO 0.381 0.347 -1.392 6.2508** 
SALES -0.198 2.7037 -0.124 1.4764 
LEV -0.656 5.7495** -0.639 7.2151*** 
Year Dummies Included  
Industry Dummies Included  
Likelihood Ratio χ² 52.26*** 94.44*** 
Pseudo R² 0.02 0.03 
Sample Size 2,532 2,532 
Notes: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
STICKYD1 is cost stickiness dummy variable scaled by selling and administrative expenses. 1 if sticky is less than 0, otherwise 0. 
STICKYD2 is cost stickiness dummy variable scaled by total cost. 1 if sticky is less than 0, otherwise 0.   
STICKY1 is cost stickiness continuous variable scaled by selling and administrative expenses. 
STICKY1 is cost stickiness continuous variable scaled by total cost. 
IC is the natural logarithm of number of personnel of internal accounting 
GROUPD is 1 if the enterprise belongs to a conglomerate, 0 otherwise 
SIZE  is the natural logarithm of (total asset of current term/total sales of current term) 
WORKER  is (number of employees*1,000,000/total sales of current term) 
CFO  is : (Cash flow from operating activities of the current term/ total asset of the current term) 
SALES  is 1 if sales of term t-1 is decreased compared to term t-2, 0 otherwise 
LEV  is (total debt of the current term/total asset of the current term) 
 
Importance of Personnel in Each Department Assigned to Internal Accounting Control System (Additional 
Test 3) 
 
Revision of the form "operation report on internal accounting management system" in September 2002 
came to require enterprises to publicly announce their ownership status of internal accounting control organization 
personnel and certified public accountants. Referring to the table provided in the part on measurement of personnel 
status for internal accounting control system, enterprises must publicly announce affiliated institution and 
department of human resources assigned to internal accounting. The department is classified into auditor 
(committee), board of directors, accounting department, capital operation department, electronic operation 
department and other relevant departments. 
 
While auditor (committee) and board of directors perform the role of generally managing and reviewing 
internal accounting control system, accounting department, capital operation department and electronic operation 
department are actual departments that execute the procedure of internal control. Based on the operation report on 
internal accounting control system publicly announced by each enterprise, this study additionally analyzed the effect 
of importance of internal accounting personnel affiliated to accounting department (ACC_NUM), capital operation 
department (CAP_NUM) and electronic operation department (ELE_NUM) on downward stickiness. The results of 
additional analysis are shown in Table 7. 
 
As a result of analysis, the coefficient of ACC_NUM was –7.152 (t-value=-10.47) and showed 
significantly negative (-) influence on dependent variable STICKY1 at 1% significance level. CAP_NUM and 
ELE_NUM were not significant. In the verification result using STIKCY2 measured by total cost, the coefficient of 
ACC_NUM was –4.365 (t-value=-13.59) and showed significantly negative (-) influence on dependent variable 
STICKY2 at 1% significance level. 
 
Such results suggest that ownership of sufficient accounting personnel to internally review financial 
statements is effective in monitoring downward stickiness in accounting departments that perform accounting works 
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like equity method and deferred corporate tax and prepare for consolidated financial statements and cash flow 
statement.  
Table 7: Effect of Internal Accounting Control System Personnel on Cost Stickiness 
(for Each Internal Control Department) 
Variables 
Dependent Variable 
STICKY1 STICKY2 
Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
Intercept 0.399 1.09 0.592 4*** 
DEP_NUM 
ACC_NUM -7.152 -10.47*** -4.365 -13.59*** 
CAP_NUM 3.364 0.76 -1.266 -0.6 
ELE_NUM 10.626 1.42 4.864 1.5 
GROUPD 0.077 0.55 -0.056 -0.99 
SIZE 0.048 0.78 0.056 1.96** 
WORKER 10.892 0.46 -7.273 -0.67 
CFO 0.185 0.26 -0.247 -0.83 
SALES 0.061 0.46 0.032 0.59 
LEV -0.428 -1.39 -0.324 -2.56** 
Year Dummies Included  
Industry Dummies Included  
F-value 5.18*** 8.42*** 
Adj. R² 0.09 0.1 
Sample Size 2,532 2,532 
Notes: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
STICKY1 is cost stickiness continuous variable scaled by selling and administrative expenses. 
STICKY1 is cost stickiness continuous variable scaled by total cost. 
dep_num = the ratio of the number of internal accounting control personnel in each department 
acc_num = the ratio of the number of internal accounting control personnel in accounting department to the total number of employees 
cap_num = the ratio of the number of internal accounting control personnel in finance department to the total number of employees 
ele_num = the ratio of the number of internal accounting control personnel in information technology and system department to the total number 
of employeesGROUPD is 1 if the enterprise belongs to a conglomerate, 0 otherwise 
SIZE  is the natural logarithm of (total asset of current term/total sales of current term)  
WORKER  is (number of employees*1,000,000/total sales of current term) 
CFO  is : (Cash flow from operating activities of the current term/ total asset of the current term) 
SALES  is 1 if sales of term t-1 is decreased compared to term t-2, 0 otherwise 
LEV  is (total debt of the current term/total asset of the current term) 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
Ever since Anderson et al. (2003) defined asymmetric response of cost to increase and decrease in sales as 
'sticky cost behavior', there had been many studies on downward stickiness of cost. When sales volume is reduced, 
entrepreneurs are required to decide whether to continue possessing surplus resources in preparation for future 
recovery in sales or to dispose resources and reacquire disposed resources later on (Anderson et al. 2003). 
Representative examples of adjustment cost include severance pay for employees being dismissed, cost for new 
recruitment, cost for training and cost to cope with reduced morale of remaining employees. An entrepreneur has an 
incentive to not reduce cost despite reduction in sales as to maintain one's status and utility. 
 
Many subsequent studies reported occurrence of downward sticky cost behavior caused by the agency 
problem, and they emphasized the role of control system as a means to reduce the agency problem. Previous studies 
reported that downward stickiness of cost can be relaxed when there is an appropriate monitoring device to observe 
agency problems such as corporate governance structure. Accordingly, internal accounting control system was 
considered in this study as a monitor of the agency problems. In specific, effectiveness of internal accounting control 
system was examined by size of human resources that belong to the system, and the aim was to verify whether 
downward stickiness of cost differs according to size of human resources. 
 
Internal accounting control system was implemented to improve and enhance reliability of financial and 
accounting information. Internal accounting control system must be effectively operated in order to satisfy such 
intent of implementation, and operation of internal accounting control system would depend on the personnel in 
charge of internal accounting. The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations (COSO) also recommends enterprises to 
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support effective internal control by possessing sufficient number of human resources for internal control. In other 
words, when an enterprise possesses sufficient number of internal accounting personnel, it can show appropriate 
distribution of work and effective internal control based on timely review and monitoring of accounting functions. 
The authors of this study predicted that larger size of internal accounting control system personnel will result in 
relaxation of downward cost stickiness as pursuit of private benefit by entrepreneurs can be effectively controlled. 
 
As a result of empirical analysis, larger size of personnel assigned to internal accounting control system 
was found to lessen downward stickiness of cost. Such result implies that the agency problem can be effectively 
controlled due to excellent monitoring efficiency when size of personnel in charge of internal accounting control 
system is large. As an additional verification, departments to which internal accounting personnel are affiliated were 
considered to examine the effect of internal accounting personnel in each department on downward stickiness of 
cost. The verification result showed that larger size of internal accounting personnel affiliated to accounting 
departments, which directly participate in preparation of financial statements, plays greater role of lessening 
downward stickiness of cost compared to other departments. 
 
The results of this study are meaningful in that they expanded the scope of study conducted by Chen et al. 
(2012) on asymmetric behavior of cost. Chen et al. (2012) argued that since control systems of an enterprise affects 
decision making of the entrepreneur, control systems like corporate governance structure can affect asymmetry of 
cost. This study considered internal accounting control system as a controller and monitor. The results of this study 
verified that enterprises with greater investment on personnel in charge of internal accounting control system show 
relaxed downward stickiness of cost due to high intensity of monitoring. 
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